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Grassroots Report

Confrooting Middle East Issues
MELANI

McALISTER

During the past year, Boston
Mobilization for Survival has sponsored several introductory courses on
the Middle East. The first, "Women
Demystifying the Middle East,'' was
facilitated by two feminists who felt
that women were often shut out of
discussions about the Middle East by
''male experts preaching the word.''
Jennifer Bing and Jenny Linger led two
different discussion groups that aimed
to bring the Middle East onto the agenda of feminist activists. Another
course, on ''US Policy in the Middle
East,'' was taught by Mobilization
Middle East Task Force members last
spring. That four week course was aimed at activists (anti-intervention, gay
and lesbian, disarmament) who were
interested in getting a basic understanding of the Arab/Israeli/Palestinian
conflict. The course was filled, with a
waiting list, and-interestingly-most
of the participants were women.
The remarks in this article were
derived from conversations with the
facilitators of the Women Demystifying course, my own experience with the
US Policy course, and discussions and
conversations with other Middle East
activists.
The Middle East, and the Arab/
Israeli/Palestinian conflict in particular, has-until relatively
recently-been studiously ignored by
most of the peace movement. Even as
''the movement'' has grown from
Continued on page Two
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Middle East Issues
Continuftl Jrom PDI~ On~
"anti-war" to "anti-nuke" to a more
comprehensive "peace with justice"
movement, and even as the left has
begun to clearly articulate the ''deadly
connection'' between US intervention
and nuclear war, the Middle East has
remained noticeably off the
agenda-"too difficult," "too complex," "too hot to handle."
The silence around the Middle East
has less to do with lack of information
(the so-called media blackout), or with
the complexity of issues (the Middle
East is objectively no more difficult to
understand than any other issue progressive activists have to grapple with)
than with a convergence of benign
neglect, political convenience, and
deep-rooted emotional barriers. In the
face of the obvious importance of the
region as the world's major recipient of
US military aid and the most likely
flashpoint for nuclear war, the costs of
maintaining a "safe" silence have
become increasingly unbearable.
On the face of it, the Arab/Israeli/
Palestinian conflict is an easy one to ignore. On the one hand, the region is
half a world away and, for most Americans, there has been little to bring
it home. Until recently perhaps,
there has been a sense that these are not
really our problems: there have been
few refugees in our midst; our children
aren't having nightmares; very few
Americans have been killed (the
Marines in. Lebanon were the exception, and the relative absence of public
outcry is indicative). On the other
hand, there is a powerful feeling of
identification with Israel. This goes
beyond the hegemony of the ''proIsrael'' perspective in the mainstream
media and politics to a sense that
Israelis are ''like us'' in a way that
other Middle Easterners are decidedly
not: Israel is portrayed as essentially a
Western culture; Israelis are secular,
pragmatic people with whom we share
a common Judea-Christian ethic; the
place is well-managed, the travel is
pleasant, the food is good. Beyond
that, many of us in the peace movement are attracted by the notion that
Israel is a socialist, democratic, even
feminist haven. Israel was founded as a
socialist state. It was an experiment in
putting ideals into practice: the kibbutzim, the collective working of the land,
''making the desert bloom.'' Those images, combined with the fact that an
active and significant part of the left
has historically been strongly (though
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not uncritically) pro-Zionist, has made
the Palestinian issue, prima facie,
unusually difficult and potentially
divisive for the peace movement.
At the risk of over-simplification, I
will argue that the barriers for progressives in doing Middle East work are at
least three: fears that criticisms of
Israel are anti-Semitic; an anti-Arab
racism that is so pervasive and accepted as to often be invisible;
and-for the women's movement in
particular-concerns raised about the
oppression of women in Islamic/Arab
countries.

this. The Crusades, the Holocaust, the
Ku Klux Klan-the entire history of
Jewish oppression should give us
pause. The concern-that we don't fall
into the trap of "blaming the Jews"
again -is well-founded. The
response-that the Zionist answer to
this persecution is the only legitimate
one; that the "Jewish state" as it is
presently constituted is the only solution; and that this state must be above
and beyond our usual criticisms of
government policies-is both misguided and counter-productive. To
identify Israel as the sole representation or embodiment of Judaism is
simply not accurate, as Jews inside and
Anti-Semitism
There is a s~nse, perhaps especially outside Israel will testify. Perhaps
among those who are new to the issue more importantly, Israel is a diverse
or among folks who have strong emo- nation of many competing parties and
tional ties to Israel, that criticism of political tendencies, some of which
Israel is inevitably anti-Semitic. Both have been quite outspoken about the
Zionists and non-Zionists, for very dif- untenability and the immorality of
ferent reasons, have set up the equa- their government's policy. In fact, it is
tion: Israel equals Jews; all Jews iden- interesting to note that the range of
tify with Israel. The politically power- issues up for debate and the number of
ful corollary: criticism of Israel is tan- acceptable approaches to the Palestitamount to anti-Semitism. For pro- nian conflict is much broader for the
gressives, the suggestion of anti- Israeli Left than for the peace moveSemitism is a powerful silencer; ment in the United States.
We must recognize, however, that
that-combined with the almost
universal "frie_nd of Israel" fervor in there are instances in which antithis country-creates an atmosphere in Zionism has been used as a cover for
which many people don't have the con- anti-Semitism, both by Arabs and by
fidence to speak, or even to ask ques- certain sectors in the United States and
tions, about the Israeli/Palestinian Europe. If one hates Jews, the selfquestion.
Continued on page Six
While the issue, for Jews and nonJews alike, is US policy toward Israel,
the Palestinians, and the Middle East,
it is more often framed as our relation
to Jews and anti-Semitism. The
tendency to uncritically support Israel,
or to avoid Middle East issues
altogether, becomes a convenient way
of trying to prove to ourselves and
others that we aren't anti-Semitic, or
"self-hating Jews." By allowing the
conditions of the debate to be so
distorted, we may avoid painful conILLEGIIIMATI AUTIIORIT~
frontations, but we also lose the ability
,...,....,, f,oc,-.J~
to ask the crucial questions (for this
region as any other): Who has the right
The Resist Newsletter is published ten
to critically examine American policy?
times a year by Resist, Inc., One
Whose interests are being furthered by
Summer Street, Somerville, MA
02144. (617) 623-5110.
that policy? How can we put forth an
Resist staff: Nancy Wechsler
alternative that could help create a just
Nancy Moniz
peace in the region? Paralyzed by the
Ken Tangvik
fear that our motives for raising these
Typesetting: Vicki Gabriner
questions are suspect, the issues are
Gay Community News
never addressed.
Red Sun Press . ...
Printing:
The history of the Jews as a persecuted people plays a powerful role in
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THE INTERVENTION
CONSENSUS:
Some Lessons From Vietnam
deed, for many leading opponents of
the Reagan administration, the Aquino
victory in the Philippines has become
the most visible symbol of their belief
that the United States could (and
should) intervene "to do good." Thus
the "Philippine Corollary" helps to
broaden support for U.S. intervention.
U.S. intervention can be sold to the U.S.
public not simply as anti-leftist, but as
pro-centrist; not simply as against
revolution, but for democracy as well.

FRANK BRODHEAD

Does

the U.S. role in deposing
Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos mark a change in U.S. foreign
policy? The toppling of the Marcos
dictatorship by the mass, nonviolent
action of the Filipino people must surely be one of the most inspiring events
of our era. Yet the lessons to be drawn
from these events are shrouded in
ambiguity. 1 What are we to make of
the image contrived for President
Reagan as a scourge of dictators? Is the
United States, as a result of the
benefits it has accrued in permitting the
toppling of Marcos and Haiti's "Baby
Doc'' Duvalier, likely to support a
populist (though noncommunist)
"third force" in Chile, South Korea,
or Indonesia, akin to the movement
that brought Mrs. Aquino to power in
the Philippines? Or is the "Reagan
Doctrine'' -the assertion that the
United States will rollback Third
World revolutions by any means necessary-st ill alive and well in
Washington? And if it is, what does
this mean for U .S.-Filipino relations?
The purpose of this essay is to bring
to these questions some of the ''lessons
of Vietnam.'' The Vietnam era has
given us a great storehouse of data on
the rhetoric and realities of US im-perial management. While the relevance of this experience for our situation today is not always clear, the vast
amount of published information
about decision making during the Vietnam war often gives us a helpful starting point to analyze current developments.
The Reagan Doctrine and the
''Philippine Corollary''
As enunciated in a presidential
speech in 1985, the Reagan Doctrine
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promises U.S. support for the overthrow of left-wing regimes, even if
this means supporting armed counterrevolution, as in Nicaragua. The Doctrine deemphasizes arms control
measures with the Soviet Union, placing a higher priority on resolving
"regional conflicts" on terms favorable to U.S. interests. In plain language, it focuses East-West policy on
gaining victories in Nicaragua, Angola,
Cambodia, and Afghanistan. It promises ''counterrevolution without
frontiers.''
On March 14, 1986, in the wake of
the Aqino victory, President Reagan
stated that U.S. policy was to oppose
rightwing dictators as well as leftwing
regimes. The hawkish New Republic
saw the speech as establishing a
"Philippine Corollary," in which the
United States now recognizes that its
interests can also be advanced by "centrist" regimes emerging out of the collapse of rightwing dictatorships. 2 In-

The "Third Force" in Vietnam
In its editorial on the "Philippine
Corollary,'' the New Repubic claimed
that the Reagan Doctrine was the ''heir
to the liberal internationalism of the
postwar era, as enunciated in the Truman Doctrine and as understood
through Kennedy until the Vietnam
War." Reagan's March 14 speech, according to the New Republic, "presents a reprise of that vision: a neointernationalist, ideologically based
foreign policy, resting on the premise
that the promotion of democracy satisfies both American interests and
values."
While the New Republic is undoubtedly correct in viewing Reagan's
foreign policy as the legitimate heir to
Cold War liberalism, it errs in seeing
the Vietnam era as a break-rather
than as a continuity-in Cold War
liberalism. As an important new study
by George McT. Kahin makes clear, 3 it
was Kennedy and (after his death) the
Camelot team that charted the path of
counterrevolutionary war in Vietnam
and sold it to Lyndon Johnson. More
to the point, it was also Kennedy and
his advisors who set the United States
against the emergence of a populist but
noncommunist political force.
The regime established (illegally) by
the United States in South Vietnam
after the 1954 Geneva Conference was

Continued on page Four
Resist Newsletter

Page Three

Intervention Consensus
Continued from page Three
entrusted to the care of Ngo Dinh
Diem. Diem was a Catholic-but Vietnam was an overwhelmingly Buddhist
country. It was from the Vietnamese
Catholics that the French colonialists
had drawn the bulk of its quislings and
collaborators. It was also from the
Catholics (as well as from the military
and the bureaucracy) that Diem drew
his initial base of support. Thus it is
not surprising that a coalition of Buddhist organizations became, after the
National Liberation Front, the focus
of anti-Diem and anti-U .S. sentiment
in South Vietnam.4 For three years,
from mid-1963 to mid-1966, the Buddhist movement served as a potential
vehicle through which the United
States could transfer its allegiance
from a rightwing dictator to a noncommunist "third force." Yet Cold War
liberalism, under both Kennedy and
Johnson, consistently rejected the option of such a third force. Both presidencies preferred to change governments as often as necessary in order to
find one which would stand firm
against demands for a U.S. withdrawal
and an end to the war, which by the
mid-1960s were coming from all ranks
of South Vietnamese society.
The Buddhists were galvanized to action, first, by the harsh repression of
the Diem regime in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, and then by the sudden
ban on the celebration of Buddha's
birthday in May 1963. Protest led to a
massacre by government troops, and
repression led to a bad press for Diem
in the United States and pressure to
ease up. But Diem, claiming that the
Buddhists were NLF agents, was soon
back at it, and martial law was imposed in August. Fearing that Diem's usefulness was finally at an end, and
angered because the Diem family had
been detected opening negotiations
with the NLF, Kennedy gave the green
light for a coup. Diem was killed and
replaced by the largely unknown Gen.
Minh.
Gen. Minh and his supporters soon
proved to be completely unreliable,
failing to follow U.S. advice. "Even
more alarming," notes Prof. Kahin,
''was the possibility that they might
negotiate a 'neutralist' solution involving an end to the fighting and a compromise agreement with the National
Liberation Front" (182). Minh, moreover, began moving toward the Buddhists, who had formed a unified
organization at the end of 1963. The
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dangers of peace were exacerbated by
growing international pressures,
especially from France, for settling the
war through some kind of neutralization formula. Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara feared that ''current trends, unless reversed in the next
2-3 months, will lead to neutralization
at best and more likely to a
Communist-controlled state" (193). In
short, Minh would have to go. He was
replaced by Gen. Khanh in a
U .S.-organized coup at the end of
January 1964.
The U.S. attitude toward Gen.
Khanh was initially very favorable.
Khanh was described by McNamara as
"highly responsive to U.S. advice."
Nevertheless, according to the Pentagon Papers, "[Ambassador Maxwell]
Taylor feared the GVN [Khanh's
government] might get tired and want
to negotiate if they could not get the
U.S. more involved" (cited 215). Bombing the North was initially intended to
shore up the flagging morale of the
South. Khanh was told in July, for example, that the U.S. government "had
considered attacks that might begin
. . . if the pressure from dissident
South Vietnamese factions became too
great" (217). The fabricated Tonkin
Gulf incident of August 1964 provided
the pretext for this action.
The bombing of the North was unpopular in the South. In defiance of a
declared state of emergency, protests
by the Buddhists intensified, and
Khanh began to lose support within the
South Vietnamese military. Confronted also with growing criticism
from Washington, Khanh suddenly
turned to the organized Buddhists for
support. This set off alarm bells in
Washington; the CIA cabled that
"Khanh had 'in effect put his government completely in the hands of [Buddhist leader] Tri Quang' ''; and that
Khanh intended to ask Tri Quang to
form a government by November 1
(234). This would mean an end to the
U.S. presence in Vietnam.
'' Among Americans in both
Washington and Saigon," notes Prof.
Kahin, ''the belief became more and
more widespread that the formidable
mass backing obtained by the Buddhist
leaders was basically dependent upon
their espousal of neutralist goals-an
end to the fighting and a negotiated
peace with the NLF, followed by a
coalition government" (234). "The
abiding problem for American of-
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ficials," states Kahin, "was that the
more broadly based and responsible to
public opinion a Saigon government
became, the less disposed it would be
to continue with the fighting, and the
greater the popular pressure it would
be under to negotiate a neutralist
political settlement incompatible with
any continuing U.S. presence" (238).
This is the dilemma faced today by
the U.S. counterrevolutionary project
throughout the world. Only a strong
nationalist movement can provide the
United States with a platform from
which it can defeat the guerrillas on the
left. But a nationalist movement with
genuine roots among the peasantry and
the urban lower classes seems to turn
inevitably into a vehicle for national
self-determination, and asks the
United States to leave!
In early 1965, to head off the imminent prospect of the formation of a
neutralist government under Buddhist
influence or leadership, the United
States began the sustained bombing of
the North. But this only increased instability in the South. Two days after
the February 7 attack on the U.S.
forces at Pleiku, which served as the
pretext for the U.S. bombing of the
North, Ambassador Taylor sent the
following cable to Washington:
Increasing indications that Buddhist
Institute orchestrating strong antiAmerican campaign with neutralist
overtones, evidently to picture U.S.
presence and interference as main
obstacle to peace in Vietnam and present selves as only independent group
capable of leading Vietnamese people
to settlement of conflict without
heavy intensification of war effort.
Institute leadership apparently playing on what they feel is widespread
popular desire for peace, as well as
on latent nationalism of younger
generation in particular. (288)

Within weeks Gen. Khanh was ousted
in yet another U .S.-organized coup.
Khanh was replaced by a government which soon came to be headed by
Generals Ky and Thieu, who were to
guide the fortunes of Vietnam until the
collapse in 1975. Unlike their
predecessors, Ky and Thieu raised no
questions about the U.S. military
build-up, and even suggested ways in
which the war could be expanded.
With the ensuing U.S. invasion, which
quickly brought the number of U.S.
troops in Vietnam to 400,000, the last
chapter in the sad story of Vietnam's
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.. third force" began.
The organized Buddhists understood
that peace could only be achieved if the
Americans were to leave. Recognizing
that they could not directly confront
U.S. military power, the Buddhist
movement agitated for an elected
legislative assembly. The newly elected
leaders, reasoned the Buddhists, would
be in a position to negotiate with the
NLF to end the war. Cognizant of the
dangers such an election would pose,
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge,
''with the backing of most top officials
in the Johnson administration, remained determined to avoid elections until
after the war had been won, or at least
until after the Saigon military were
solidly and unchallengeably in
control" (414).
The showdown between the Buddhist movement and the U.S. occupiers
began in early 1966, when the Buddhists put themselves at the head of a
protest movement aimed at stopping
the ouster of the popular Gen. Thi, the
(Buddhist) military commander of
South Vietnam's five northernmost
provinces, which included the cities of
Danang and Hue. ''Throughout most
of that area not under NLF control,''
notes Kahin, ''the movement now
began to exert authority. And it called
publicly not only for the prompt
establishment of an interim legislative
assembly and a clear-cut schedule for
elections to a constituent assembly, but
also for the end of the military's
political leadership in Saigon" (418).
To forestall such a disaster, Ky and
Lodge promised elections, and then
reneged on their promises once the protests began to ebb. Demonstrations
were immediately renewed, but now
they were directed explicitly at the
United States as well as the military
leadership. Hue Radio declared that
"the rascals in Saigon are receiving
orders from the White House and
American Embassy in Saigon," and
"the U.S. wants to conquer our country under the guise of helping to fight
communism" (420-21). The revolt in
the northern provinces became nearly
total. "Never," notes Kahin, "had any
South Vietnamese government stood
more naked of indigenous backing. In
the words of a retrospective U.S. intelligence assessment, there was an
'almost total absence of any organized
popular support, or even sympathy for
the American-backed regime' " (421).
The Saigon government struck back.
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Aided directly by U.S. military forces
in Danang and Saigon, Ky and Thieu
began a sustained and bloody assault
on the popular movement. U.S. aircraft and ground forces were critical to
the success of this operation, in which
virtually the entire U.S. national
security establishment was involved in
its planning. The critical move was
Ambassador Lodge's assurance to the
Buddhists that elections would be held.
Yet once calm was restored, Ky once
again reneged on this promise, with
Lodge's backing. A major military expedition was then launched against
Danang on May 15. Operating from
the U.S. base at Danang, Ky's planes
bombed and strafed troops loyal to the
Buddhist movement. U.S. troops
blocked sympathetic military forces
from coming to the aid of proBuddhist troops in Danang. Ky then
moved against the Buddhists in Saigon
and Hue, with direct U.S. military support again being critical.
These events marked the end of Vietnam's "third force." Whatever
possibilities had existed that a noncommunist solution could be found in Vietnam had been eliminated. Henceforth,
as Kahin notes, ''Vietnamese who lived
in the Saigon-controlled areas remained convinced that the dominance of
[Ky and Thieu] could not be contested
so long as the United States stood
solidly behind them; and that is
precisely what both the Johnson and
Nixon administrations did" (432).
Conclusion

Even if shaded with a Philippines
Corollary, there are many problems
with the up-dated Reagan Doctrine.
One is that it does grave injustice to the
basic facts to stuff Duarte, or Angola's
Savimbi, or Turkey's Gen. Evren-to
say nothing of the feudal tribesmen of
Afghanistan or the Pol Pot forces of
Kampuchea-into the mold of the
"democratic center." A second problem is that no support is advanced to
the democratic center of the
U .S.-supported regimes in South
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, or
Pakistan, which remain off limits to
the winds of change. Thirdly, the
Philippines Corollary was enunciated
only two days before Reagan's March
16 speech urging Congress to support
the contras, and it is understandable if
some critics interpreted the renunciation of the now-long-gone Marcos as a
ploy to gain votes for contra aid.
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But seen in the light of the Vietnam
experience, the U.S. quest for a "third
force'' is a cruel deceit on both the
U.S. public and on the noncommunist
populists of the Third World. Supposed democratic centrists like Duarte in
El Salvador and Cruz in his
Washington "exile" are maintained
only for their usefulness in selling U.S.
military aid programs to Congress.
Real centrist forces, like those in Vietnam, are recognized as threats to U.S.
plans for their country and speedily
deposed.
It is likely that the Aquino regime in
the Philippines will soon put this thesis
to the test. If the United States follows
the path that became well-worn in Vietnam, it will continue to support Mrs.
Aquino only as long as she cooperates
in the war against the guerrillas, and in
giving support for U.S. military and
economic interests in the region. If her
government pursues a genuinely
nationalist course, however, diverting
her country's resources to the needs of
its own people and attempting to pursue an independent foreign policy, the
United States will throw its support to
the Filipino Thieus and Kys waiting in
the wings.

Frank Brodhead, a Resist board
member, is an activist and author living in Philadelphia.
1. The nature of the Philippines
"election coup, " the future of the
Aquino government, and the means by
which U.S. policies assisted in the
ousting of Marcos remain ambiguous.
For a discussion of these issues see my
"The U.S. Media and the 'Election
Coup' in the Philippines," Radical
America, Volume 20, No. 1 (1986)
2. "The Philippine Corollary,"
April 7, 1986.
3. Intervention: How America
Became Involved in Vietnam (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). Page
references in this essay are to Kah in 's
study.
4. Prior to the Tet Offensive of 1968,
and to the Phoenix assassination program of the late '60s and early '70s, it
would not be far-fetched to call the National Liberation Front (NLF) itself a
"third force." Vietnamese Communists stayed equidistant from the
Soviet Union and China during the
Sino-Soviet split; they learned from the
bad experience of the Geneva ConJerence that it could not trust them
Continued on page Eight
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Middle East Issues
Continued from page Two
proclaimed "Jewish state" is all too
convenient a target for that hatred.
Those of us on the Left must recognize
that hidden anti-Semitism when it occurs and condemn it, while at the same
time not allowing the Israeli government or its apologists to use those instances as a pretext to stifle all
criticism. There is-both in principle
and practice-an important distinction
between criticism of Israel, or even a
critique of Zionism, and antisemitism. Despite attempts from both
sides to blur it, that distinction is vital
to maintain. In fact, the simplistic
''support for Israel = support of the
Jews" solution may allow people to
avoid focusing on the very real antiSemitism that colors American society.
(The neo-Nazis, the LaRouchites, the
Klan, and the Christian Right are only
the most blatant examples.)
Both the US and Israeli governments
benefit from the silence that the antiIsrael = anti-Semitism equation engenders. As has been pointed out by
friend and foe alike, Israel-whose
economy and military are almost completely dependent on US aid-champions American ''interests'' in the
Middle East. The US government's
policy interests have been consistent: to
keep the USSR out of the region, to
prevent the rise of potentially antiAmerican Arab nationalism, to maintain control of oil. If the US can clothe
its pursuit of those interests in the noble rhetoric of combatting antiSemitism and defending the ''little
guy" (now one of the world's largest
military powers), so much the better.
Anti-Arab racism
The role that anti-Arab racism plays
is somehow more difficult to get a handle on. Progressives, and this was true
of the Mobe course participants as
well, are often quite willing to admit
that fear of anti-Semitism or of being
labeled as anti-Semitic creates a barrier
to their understanding of and political
activity around the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict. It's much more difficult to
talk about the fact that a concurrent,
and often unconscious, anti-Arab
racism is usually at work as well.
One of the more interesting aspects
of this concerns the questions we don't
ask -questions about Palestinian
security, about Palestinian rights,
about Arab perspectives in general. So
often in the press and in our political
work, questions are raised from a
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remarkably Israel-focused perspective.
Even many Middle East activists will
argue that we should work for Palestinian rights because Israel's security,
Israel's democratic future, or Israel's
economic viability depend on it. That's
not a bad perspective in and of itself,
but it is often not accompanied by any
sort of parallel concern for the future
of the Palestinian population. Whether
or not a particular peace proposal is
best for the Palestinians is really secondary, just as Arabs in general are often
perceived as secondary (or, at best,
obstructionist) in a conflict that has
left 4 million Palestinians stateless
(half of those are now in exile) and
many thousands dead since 1948.
The Mobe course participants spent
some time listing the uncensored images
we
have
of
Arabs,
Palestinians and
Muslims. The
general tenor was not surprising: dirty,
greedy, fanatic, terrorist, veiled. Even
if nobody really believes that these
stereotypes represent reality, we don't
have much else to work with. Theimages of Arabs presented in our popular
media are more blatantly racist than
any since those of the Japanese in
World War II. It's hard to imagine
how anyone who lived through the oil
crisis in 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1978 could not be affected by
the deluge of stereotypes spewed forth
by TV and in print: Arabs are fat,
filthy rich sheiks drooling over "our"
women while the Arab women remain
hidden behind veils, or Muslims (Iranians aren't Arabs but they'll do for
the media) are skinny fanatics who hijack, take hostages, and rant and rave
about "infidel imperialism." These
sort of racist images have very old
roots in our society, and they remain
acceptable today in a way that other
racist propaganda does not. The flood
rages on: this year's Rambo doll line
up features a member of the
S.A.V.A.G.E. international terror network named Nomad-"he grew up
without a home and now hates everything and everybody.''
In more subtle ways, the anti-Arab
racism of American society can affect
our ability to make distinctions, to
understand who Arabs and Palestinians and Muslims are. Part of what
paralyzes us around Middle East issues
is the inability of large sectors of the
progressive movement to distinguish
between Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular, or among the wide-

Resist Newsletter

ly divergent factions of the PLO, or
between Arabs and Islam.
The media and the Reagan administration's manipulation of terrorism provides an excellent example.
To examine particulars: Our justifiable
sadness and outrage at the killings in
Rome and Vienna a year ago, or at the
murder of 12 Jews in a synagogue in
Turkey this September, is somehow
translated into the sense that it's "us"
and the Israelis against ''them,'' the
terrorists. What is surprising to note
here is not that Palestinian violence
makes the headlines while Israeli
violence on a grander scale does not:
these particular Palestinians were seeking headlines, were trying to get the attention of the world, while the Israelis,
bombing Palestinian refugee camps in
"retaliatory" strikes, are aiming to
punish Palestinian civilian populations
while avoiding international publicity.
And of course, the press is far more intersted in the singular drama of the hijacking, the synagogue bombing, etc.
than in the weekly repetition of a few
dozen Palestinian corpses lying in a
refugee camp.
What is important, and tragic, is
that we don't know, and we allow
ourselves not to know, that those acts
of violence were condemned by the
mainstream of the PLO and by the vast
majority of Palestinians. Somehow
those of us who have little difficulty in
understanding the differences in
political perspectives between, say,
Gatsha Buthelezi and the ANC, or between Pope John Paul and the liberation theologists, or even between
Bachrach and Kennedy, have allowed
ourselves to lump "Arabs" into an undifferentiated mass that includes
Arafat, Abu Nidal, refugee kids throwing stones at Israeli patrols, and
Muslim fundamentalist ''mobs'' about
to riot in Cairo.
None of us are really exempt from
this. Even those of us who do Middle
East work are guilty of "disappearing"
Arabs and Arab Americans. A classic
example occured last spring when a
group of activists were planning a
panel on the bombing of Libya. We
thought of three possible speakers who
were, it so happened, a Jew, a WASP,
and an Arab-American. Without a second thought, we agreed that one of
the first two speakers should address
the section on U.S. policy toward
Libya, since U.S. policy should be
discussed by an American. It wasn't
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until a few moments later that we
realized that we had unwittingly
assented to the belief that ArabAmericans are not actually Americans
like the rest of us.
Again, both the United States and
Israel have a stake in reinforcing racist
stereotypes of Arabs. If we remain ignorant of the political and cultural
realities of the Middle East, mobilized
only by images of hatred and fear, we
cannot provide much of an opposition
to government policies. If we buy into
the scenario of Israelis as peaceloving
people besieged by fanatic terrorists,
then we will understand that Israel
MUST prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian/terrorist state; the United
States CANNOT recognize the right of
the Palestinians to self-determination;
Israel MUST establish a ''security
zone" in the territories of southern
Lebanon, etc. Reagan's anti-Quaddafi
rhetoric went too far for most progressives, but both the US and the Israeli
governments use-and benefit
from-the pervasive anti-Arab feeling
in both societies. *(Just as the Left has
confronted sexism, racism, and classism within our ranks, we must-if we
are to organize effectively on the Middle East-confront our own feelings
about Arabs/Palestinians/Muslims.)
Feminism

Interestingly enough, the question
that came up most often in the US
Policy course concerned women in the
Arab world. The media images are extremely powerful here: veiled women,
Muslim men who keep four wives, orif we are following the most recent
debates-female circumcision. One
might view these concerns as the
familiar first world/third world debate
over defining women's issues, but it
seems to be more than that. At some
level, our concern as feminists is probably being reinforced by dark visions
of Arabs as misogynists who force
women into veils, or harems, or both.
And Islam is understood to be a religion which is inherently oppressive, inevitably fundamentalist, and essentially backward.
In this case, it seems, our stereotypes
about Muslims and Arabs are so
powerful that we begin to ask questions with a very different intent than
we ask questions about, say, women in
Central America. For example: many
of us have examined feminist and gay/
lesbian issues in Nicaragua, but we
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have done so with a certain openmindedness, a willingness to seek out and
support those who are leading the
struggle in that society. When we look
at Arab/Palestinian society (if we do),
if seems we have often done so quite
judgmentally, as if our purpose is to
decide whether or not these folks are
feminist enough for us. One can't help
but wonder whether, again, Arab/Islamic sexism isn't being used to justify
a colonial mentality. Are we concerned
first and foremost as feminists? Or are
we, at some level, lured by those
powerful, ugly myths into trying to
decide whether or not "these people"
deserve self-determination?
It's not surprising that our images of
Arabs are paralleled by the vision of
Israel as a feminist haven-a land
where women and men are equal partners in the pioneering venture that
created the state. Of course, whether or
not that image of Israel is true ought to
be irrelevant to our discussion about
Arab/Palestinian women. But somehow the comparison seems to hover
over many discussions of ''women in
the Arab world,'' as if we were trying
to decide whether Arab women aren't
better off under Israeli rule. (This
argument is made quite forthrightly by
some supporters of the Israeli occupation, who point out, for example, that
Israel (unlike Jordan) gave Palestinian
women on the West Bank and Gaza the
right to vote. It's startling to realize
that this sort of "gilded cage" argument carries as much weight as it does
in our post-colonial era.)
None of this is to argue that we cannot or should not examine critically the
very real oppression of women-as
women-that continues in the Arab
world and in Israel as elsewhere. In doing so, there is much to be said about
the role played by religion-Islam,
Christianity, and Judaism-in the
institutionalization of that oppression.
But to do so with integrity, we must be
able to make distinctions: Islam is not
monolithic; and the role of women is a
hotly debated topic in Muslim countries. The idea of a "Muslim feminist"
is not inherently more incongruous
than the idea of a "Catholic feminist."
And feminist struggles are being waged
by women in many Middle Eastern
societies to confront sexism and to
challenge the legal discrimination
against them. Those struggles are as exciting, and certainly as revolutionary,
as anything happening in the United
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States and Europe today. As feminists,
we have tended to ignore those trends;
but until we get past our own blindspots and start listening to the Arab
women who are writing and organizing
around women's issues, we cannot
begin to assess how women have, and
don't have, power in Middle Eastern
societies.
Conclusion

Increasingly, the disarmament and
anti-intervention movements have
begun to see the importance of grappling with US involvement in the Middle
East. The United States is supporting
both Israel and the "moderate" Arab
governments with billions of dollars
worth of highly sophisticated arms as
well as other aid. And the US government has poured vast resources into developing an extensive network of
bases, Rapid Deployment forces, and
other interventionary capabilities. At
least six times since 1945, the United
States has threatened the use of nuclear
weapons in the Middle East. (In 1973,
the US forces were on full nuclear
alert.)
So far, the US government has
managed to maintain hegemony fairly
successfully: the Soviets are weak in
the Middle East, most of the major oil
resources are in the hands of
"friendly" governments, nationalist
and radical movements have been
largely unsuccessful, and Israel is the
strongest military and economic power
in the region.
But the risks of maintaining that
policy are enormous, and the parallels
with US interventionist policy in other
regions of the world are too disturbing
to ignore. For the peace movement,
understanding of the US role in the
Middle East and speaking out about it
have become necessities. It is crucial
that we look at events in the Middle
East in some of the same terms, and
with the same critical perspectives, that
we use for events in South Africa or
Central America (without, of course,
ignoring the specifics and the distinctions). We also need to articulate the
links among issues, to make the
connections necessary for a more unified and coherent peace movement.
And increasingly, disarmament and
anti-intervention activists are doing
just that. In Boston, anti-intervention
groups like Mobilization for Survival
and peace organizations like the
Continued on next page
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Eviction Free Zone, c/o City Life, 335
Lamartine St., Jamaica Plain, MA
02130.
In response to unprecedented
displacement of poor and not-so-poor
residents of Boston neighborhoods
Jamaica Plain and Roxbury, City Life,
a tenants' rights group, has launched
an Eviction Free Zone Coalition which
includes several other pro-tenant
organizations. It is a bold initiative to
fight evictions, aid low-income
homeowners, and find long-term solutions to displacement, such as
cooperative housing. Within the target
area, they plan to educate tenants to
their rights, organize tenants so they
can respond as a group wherever possible, and when necessary, provide legal
backup through a local legal services
center. In less than a year the group has
organized several major actions in
Jamaica Plain and Roxbury and have
reached over 200 people threatened by
displacement. Reports have shown that
housing prices in Jamaica Plain have
recently risen faster than in any other
neighborhood in the country and
Money Magazine has rated Jamaica
Plain as one of the most lucrative areas
in the country to invest in. Many housing activists in the area feel that the
creation of an eviction free zone will
scare off potential speculators and luxury condo developers who have been
fueling the housing crisis. A Resist
grant went towards a stipend for a tenant organizer for the Hispanic community within the eviction free zone.
Take Back the Night Coalition, 78
North Marengo Ave., Pasadena, CA
91109.
The Take Back the Night Coalition
is a group of organizations representing anti-violence and feminist movements and communities ot color in Los
Angeles. It was formed in solidarity
with the Black Coalition Fighting Back
Serial Murders, a community group
which was organized in January, 1986,
out of concern for the murders of at
least 17 women, most of whom are
Black, in South Central L.A.; in
respons<" to the violence committed
against women of color, immigrant
and refugee women; and in protest of
the violence that threatens women each
day of our lives.
Violence against women of color,
immigrant, undocumented and refugee
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women in L.A. is largely unreported
and ignored, adding to their already
multiple burdens of racism, sexism and
economic oppression.
The purpose of the Take Back the
Night Coalition is to support women in
communities of color working on these
issues, to raise public awareness that
violence against any women is violence
against all women, and to apply pressure to those officials who wield the
power to change these intolerable situations.
Their work, since June, 1986, has
been on several levels. They've held
weekly vigils in front of police headquarters in downtown Los Angeles,
demanding a meeting with the Black
Coalition Fighting Back Serial
Murders. They have also become
"regulars" on the local Thursday evening newscasts. Thus, these vigils have
focused much-needed media attention
on the unsolved murders, which have
not been widely publicized. They are
currently planning a public forum on
"Race, Rape, and Violence Against
Women," and their largest project is a
"Take Back the Night March," which
took place October 25. Resist's grant
paid for some of the expenses of the
march.

Thank You!
A few months ago we put out a special
request for funds so that Resist could
buy its own (much nee~ed) computer,
since we had been sharing an antique
model with several other movement
groups for many years. We had a tremendous response!! Lotus Inc.
donated a used IBM PC and you, our
readers, contributed another $850
which was used to buy a printer and a
monitor. The system is now set up in
our office and ready to go. We would
like to make one more special request.
We have determined that we will need
to spend an additional $1,500 on software, most of it going to a donor-bank
program that was developed by folks at
the Funding Exchange. If you would
like to respond to this special request
please fill out the form below and send
whatever you cart afford. We'll keep
you posted on our progress.
Name _____________
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Intervention Consensus
Continued from page Five
watch out for its interests. Moreover,
the NLF, made up of communists and
noncommunists, also had a genuinely
separate identity during this period. It
pledged that the postliberation reunification between North and South
would be carried out in deliberate
stages, and that South Vietnam would
pursue a neutralist foreign policy.
Neutralism, however, was anathema to
Cold War liberalism, and the NLF was
treated simply as a proxy for the North
Vietnamese communist regime. By the
early 1970s, moreover, U.S. assassination and terror programs had greatly
reduced the strength of the NLF and
thus its independence from the North.

Middle East Issues
Continued from page Seven
American Friends Service Committee
work closely with Jewish organizations
(New Jewish Agenda) and with Palestinian solidarity groups (the Middle
East Solidarity Committee). Recently
several Middle East groups cosponsored an event on Israel's link to
Central America with the Central
American Solidarity Association, and
activists from many areas have begun
to accept, as a matter of course, that
the Middle East will be on the agenda
at multi-issue demonstrations and discussions. After the bombing of Libya,
an ad-hoc group of disarmament
groups got together to discuss how to
respond and began by arranging for
speakers on the issue to appear on
several local radio talk shows. There
are encouraging signs throughout the
progressive community, and reasons to
believe that, in Boston as elsewhere,
the peace activists are no longer willing
or able to wrap Middle East issues in a
veil of silence.

Melani McAlister is on the staff of
Boston Mobilization for Survival, a
recipient of several Resist grants over
the years. The views expressed here are
her own and not necessarily those of
the organization.
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